The
situation inside Tibet
The situation among Tibetans in exile
The situation among Tibet's supporters
China's position on Tibet
The situation inside Tibet
In recent years China has settled into a set of policies
that appear to be bearing fruit in Tibet, for the short
term at least. Although there are many aspects to these
policies, there are three that stand out – repression,
investment, and population transfer. All three are characterized
by restraint – the tendency to avoid excesses
that might lead to backlash.
The Chinese continue a systematic repression of the
Buddhist religion in Tibet. Monasteries are closely
monitored. Their numbers are controlled and the number
of monks at each monastery is tightly restricted. Wherever
religion takes on anti-Communist, pro-Tibet or simply
pro-Dalai Lama overtones, “re-education teams”
are quick to take over a monastery and indoctrinate
the monks on what is acceptable and what is not.
The Dalai Lama continues to be treated as a cult figure
and political activist bent on insurrection and independence.
It is forbidden to distribute or even display his image.
Other religious leaders still in Tibet are closely monitored.
Chadrel Rinpoche, previous abbot of Tashi Lhunpo monastery,
is still in detention for his role in the search for
the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, Tibet’s
second most revered leader. The Karmapa, perhaps Tibet’s
third most venerated lama, was under virtual house arrest
until he escaped Tibet at the age of fourteen in 1999.
He is now with the Dalai Lama in northern India.
Buddhist study and worship are allowed in Tibet, but
only in the mildest form. Chinese authorities appear
to be encouraging the spectacle of temples, monasteries
and festivals and at the same time discouraging participation
in religious worship and study. Some critics say this
reflects a cynical attitude more attuned to tourism
than enlightenment.
Repression extends beyond religion. Tibetans have no
means to exercise their right to self-determination.
More insidious is China’s attitude toward education.
Schools are increasingly conducted in Chinese, not Tibetan,
with Tibetans at a disadvantage to compete with Chinese.
The result is that higher education and jobs go disproportionately
to native Chinese speakers. This encourages further
Han and Hui immigration into Tibet. The result is a
simultaneous erosion of Tibetan culture and marginalization
of Tibetans in the economy.
Immigration is an ongoing problem. Although not encouraging
immigration as overtly as in the past, Chinese policies
still ensure an influx of Han and Hui. Tibetans have
become a minority in Lhasa. Economic opportunities allow
immigrants to earn much more than they can in their
home provinces. The railway being built to connect Lhasa
with the overflowing towns and cities of China will
accelerate the population transfer.
The railway is typical of the Beijing’s investment
in Tibet. Until recently investment was primarily military
(troops, missile complexes, nuclear testing facilities)
or exploitative (mines, forest harvesting) with little
concern for the Tibetans or their environment. New investment
projects are predominantly directed toward infrastructure
(railroads, dams, highways, pipelines, hydroelectric
installations, telecommunications) with greater sensitivity
toward Tibet’s economy and environment.
Beijing’s goal appears to be to simultaneously
develop and Sinocize Tibet. Chinese leaders want to
raise the standard of living and they want to completely
integrate the region so that it becomes indistinguishable
economically and ethnically from the rest of China.
This is consistent with the Communist concept of equality.
The result for Tibetans appears to be a certain ambivalence.
Opportunities are expanding, education is more available,
and health care is better. At the same time they see
their traditions and culture eroding. And they see themselves
as being marginalized and becoming second-class citizens.
The gap between Tibetan and Chinese is all too apparent
and growing. The obvious way to succeed is to become
Chinese – and this is galling.
Beijing’s repression, investment and population
transfer policies are bearing fruit. Initial efforts
were heavy-handed and ham-fisted. However, the Chinese
have been quick to learn from failures like the PetroChina
IPO and the World Bank project for population transfer.
New projects are introduced with a sophistication that
leaves long time adversaries in the West arguing only
the fine points of their implementation, rather than
China’s right to impose these projects upon the
Tibetans.
In spite of the Tibetans’ frustration, resistance
appears to be dwindling. The demonstrations and riots
of the late 1980’s and the occasional protests
and bombings of the late 1990’s have been replaced
by grumbling and dissatisfaction. Even the smallest
demonstration or protest is met with swift and overwhelming
force. Nuns have been imprisoned for years without trial
for simply singing pro-Tibet songs. Monks are beaten
and imprisoned for displaying a flag or a photograph
of the Dalai Lama. Even the flow of refugees to Nepal
has receded, partly due to more repressive measures
on the Nepal side.
The Chinese are hoping that this repression will buy
the time needed for Tibet to lose its national identity
and character. At the moment, the Chinese appear to
be succeeding.
The
situation among Tibetans in exile
It has been over forty years since the Dalai Lama fled
Tibet in 1959. The attitude of the exiles has evolved
dramatically from resistance to sustenance. At first
the refugees were intent on carrying on the resistance
to Chinese occupation. Over the years the emphasis has
shifted to establishing themselves economically in their
new homes while maintaining their cultural identity
as Tibetans. The original refugees are passing from
the scene while their children carry on together with
more recent escapees.
Much of the original leadership of the Tibetan exiles
has stepped aside to make way for the younger generation.
When the Dalai Lama passes, it will not be easy for
the Tibetans to substitute for him. No other individual
has anything approaching the stature of the Dalai Lama.
Even though others (the Karmapa, Samdhong Rinpoche)
are now coming into prominence in Dharamsala, it may
be too little, too late. Their efforts are further confounded
by the need to present a Tibetan democratic alternative
to China’s authoritarian Communist rule in Tibet.
The Tibetans are working hard to develop a truly democratic
political system for the exile community. Their government
includes a democratically elected parliament and, in
a recent development, a popularly elected prime minister.
This has created a certain amount of cognitive dissonance.
Used to having authority figures that are anointed at
birth as reincarnations, Tibetans are now addressing
for the first time the possibility of following a political
rather than a religious figure. Their ambivalence is
manifested by the fact that in their first trip to the
polls in 2001, the Tibetan exiles popularly elected
as prime minister (Kalon Tripa) Samdhong Rinpoche, a
reincarnated lama, with over 84% of the vote.
Samdhong Rinpoche supports the Dalai Lama’s Middle
Way, calling for negotiations with the Chinese to achieve
genuine autonomy for Tibet. In the past, he has called
for satyagraha, or a Gandhian resistance movement, as
the way to achieve greater freedom for Tibet. Other
Tibetans have called for other methods or processes
for achieving a resolution with the Chinese –
economic action, civil disobedience, international diplomacy,
referendum and even violent resistance.
The dispute among Tibetans is not restricted to process,
it also centers on outcome. Many Tibetans were disappointed
in 1988 when the Dalai Lama formally rejected independence
as the goal of the Tibet movement, asking instead only
for genuine autonomy. Out of loyalty to His Holiness,
the Tibetans continue to support the Middle Way, but
there is a large faction unwilling to abandon the goal
of independence. This dichotomy has caused a deep split
among Tibetans that is symptomatic of growing change
in the exile community.
The first generation of refugees was deeply religious
and unwavering in their loyalty to the Dalai Lama. Now
second generation refugees are moving into positions
of leadership. They have been brought up in India, Nepal
or the West. They are interested in democracy, in their
own economic futures and in preserving their culture
outside of Tibet. Their world centers on Dharamsala,
not Lhasa. At the same time they become more independent
and self-reliant, the Dalai Lama is choosing to become
less of a political factor in their lives. The result
is a greater cultural and political pluralism. This
multiplicity threatens to undermine the Tibet movement
unless the Tibetans can find common ground and can reinvigorate
their support and leadership.
 The
situation among Tibet's supporters
In recent years the Tibet movement has stalled. This
may be the result of a number of developments. After
a brief period of liberalization in Tibet in the early
’80s, the Chinese reacted with a crackdown in
1987. At the same time, His Holiness was moderating
his position as evidenced in the 1987 Five Point Peace
Plan and the 1988 Strasbourg Proposal. These events
probably precipitated the awarding of his Nobel Peace
Prize in 1989 which catapulted him onto the world stage.
There, his inspirational leadership quickly won many
new followers. The result was a great increase in interest
in Tibet.
This was compounded by the demise of apartheid in South
Africa, the cause célèbre of liberals
and university campuses worldwide. Activists moved briefly
to the Burma cause, but this imploded when that movement
erred by targeting international corporations as the
villains. The Burma movement was forced to declare a
victory and withdraw when the corporations by and large
mended their ways. The next cause in the queue was Tibet.
Hollywood and the entertainment industry made it the
“in” thing.
However, in some ways the Tibet movement has been a
victim of its own success. Previously, the movement
had been a relatively small one where most of the leaders
of groups around the world knew each other by reputation
if not personally. The intimate nature allowed a fairly
loose confederation with no strict overall leadership.
Most of the lead Tibet supporters had worked with the
Tibetans over many years and were content to play a
support role, informally taking their lead from His
Holiness and the exile government.
The explosion of interest in the ’90s resulted
in literally hundreds of new support organizations worldwide.
Many of these were composed of persons with little familiarity
with the Tibet community. New groups took off on their
own paths with comparatively little heed of Dharamsala’s
direction. This has been a good thing as it not only
further democratized the movement, but also increased
innovation and risk-taking. Many new ideas and approaches
came from this that might not have come from a movement
tightly controlled by Dharamsala.
However, there was a price to pay. The fast growth of
the movement allowed a fragmentation and proliferation
of messages. There are now many different groups doing
very different things and delivering inconsistent and
occasionally conflicting messages. This is compounded
by the fact that the “official” message,
the Middle Way, is not working. The official movement
has stalled and some of the “side” movements
are showing more success in their restricted spheres.
Add to this the fact that many Tibetans were not happy
to see the long-cherished goal of independence seemingly
abandoned for the political expediency of genuine autonomy.
The result has been a deep split within the Tibetan
exile community, and to a lesser extent among supporters.
While the world in general does not seem to be aware
of this split, the Tibetans and increasingly their supporters
are painfully aware of it. Unfortunately, the Chinese
are also all too aware of it.
The Chinese have always been careful to cast the Tibet
issue as being about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans
in exile. Everything they can do to deflect attention
away from the Tibetans still inside Tibet they consider
a victory. In recent years, thanks partly to the Dalai
Lama’s newfound celebrity status, as well as phenomena
such as the Resettlement Project, attention is very
much on Dharamsala and the exile Tibetans.
The sudden proliferation of new supporters and new support
groups has had another and perhaps unintended result.
The Tibet movement up until the late ’80s was
almost entirely about challenging the legitimacy of
the Chinese presence inside Tibet. All efforts were
bent on forcing the Chinese to surrender their occupation
of Tibet. Arguments centered on Tibet’s historical
independence, on Tibet’s right as a people to
self-determination and independence, on China’s
invasion and occupation of Tibet, on China’s imperialist
and exploitative policies, etc. The effort was to convince
the United Nations and individual governments of the
legitimacy of the Tibetans’ cause and the illegitimacy
of the Chinese presence.
In very recent years there has been a subtle but pervasive
change in tactics and strategy – subtle enough
that many people do not seem to be aware of what is
happening. Rather than challenging China’s right
to be in Tibet and to be making decisions there, many
Tibet support groups are spending their efforts on mitigating
China’s presence, effectively conceding China’s
right to be there and to make decisions. It is well-intentioned,
but the unintended result can be insidious. By successfully
mitigating their worst actions, we teach the Chinese
more acceptable behavior which in turn makes the Chinese
presence less objectionable. It is not entirely a bad
thing, as it improves conditions for the Tibetans who
are affected by China’s actions.
The examples are legion. Numerous groups now working
inside Tibet – be it in carpet factories, clinics
or schools – are chary of running afoul of Beijing.
They are careful not to challenge China’s right
to be in Tibet. More subtle are the groups fighting
inappropriate Chinese-sponsored economic development
inside Tibet, such as the PetroChina IPO and pipeline
or the World Bank resettlement plan or even the Pabst
billboard. Even though these campaigns are more adversarial,
they tend to challenge Beijing’s implementation
more than its right to implement. Simply the fact that
only selected projects are targeted implies that others
are “okay”.
One problem is that this seems to be granting Beijing’s
right to make the development decisions for Tibet, as
long as they do it responsibly. The subtlety is that
in protesting the project, and not the right to implement
the project, we are helping the Chinese to learn how
to do these projects acceptably. And they are fast learners.
It’s guaranteed that future IPOs will not be so
naively handled as the PetroChina debacle. The World
Bank resettlement project is going ahead without the
participation of the World Bank and with hardly a whimper
of protest, partly because the Chinese claim to have
taken some of the sharper edges off the project. We
are teaching them how to do projects gently enough that
we will no longer be able to protest them. This mitigates
the worst effects of the projects and improves conditions
for the Tibetans, but it also solidifies China’s
position inside Tibet.
China's
position on Tibet
At the same time that the Tibetans inside Tibet have
become more passive in manner and their supporters outside
have become more diffused in message and divided in
strategy, the Chinese have become more focused and more
sophisticated. After years of on-again, off-again negotiations
with the Dalai Lama, the Chinese leadership appears
to have decided to abandon the Tibetan leader as a possible
contractor for resolving the Tibet problem. The Chinese
see the Dalai Lama pulling back from his temporal and
political duties, and in failing health.
The Chinese are probably betting that when the Dalai
Lama departs the Tibet movement will collapse. Indeed,
the Tibet movement has been built around the Dalai Lama
and the Shangri-la myth – the lost Tibet. Even
the movement’s political strategy, the Middle
Way, depends upon the Dalai Lama. The central demand
of the Middle Way is for negotiations with the Dalai
Lama.
China’s leaders appear to be well-aware of their
need to liberalize both their country’s economy
and its politics. At the same time they are very much
afraid of replicating the Soviet Union’s painful
disintegration. In their minds stability seems to take
precedence over liberalization. The result is a carrot-and-stick
approach to Tibet.
Foremost is the suppression of dissent. Religious expression
is kept under tight control. Political expression, other
than adherence to the Party orthodoxy, is not tolerated.
At the same time, Beijing has begun to invest significant
sums in Tibet for development. However, this development
appears to be aimed at further Sinocizing Tibet and
removing its cultural distinctiveness.
This strategy has stabilized and solidified during the
last few years of Jiang Zemin’s tenure. In 2002
China will most likely see a change in leadership. Quite
likely Hu Jintao will take control. If past history
is any indication, this will mean a few years of reduced
political stability as the jockeying for power in Beijing
plays out.
Hu was responsible for the repressive implementation
of martial law in Tibet in the late 1980s. As such he
is seen as a hard-liner on Tibet. This may play to Tibet’s
advantage. As a hard-liner, he is one of the few persons
in China’s leadership who can be soft on Tibet.
Much as only Nixon could go to China, perhaps only Hu
can go to Tibet. Then again, he may continue his past
attitude toward Tibet – harsh repression of dissent.
Now, in September of 2002, there is some change. Gyalo
Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s brother and longtime
interlocutor for Tibet-China negotiations, visited Beijing
and Tibet during the summer of 2002. This has been followed
by a second visit by two of the Dalai Lama’s formal
representatives. While Beijing is playing down the visit
and insisting there is no change in Chinese policy,
Tibetans and the rest of the world are hoping the visit
signals a breakthrough. It is too early to tell. The
Chinese may be serious about trying to resolve the problem.
However, they have a long history of using events like
these to influence summit meetings with U.S. leaders.
Jiang Zemin is scheduled to meet with George Bush in
October, 2002.
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